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Ethics and Perception: Two Kinds of Quasi-Realism1 
 
道不遠人。人之為道而遠人, 不可以為道.2 
Attributed to Confucius,中庸 Zhongyong 13 
 
 
Abstract: Michael Huemer thinks the realist about ethical intuition is no worse off than the 
realist about sense perception when it comes to addressing the challenge of skepticism and so 
if we reject scepticism about the external, empirical world we should also reject scepticism 
about ethics. But we do not face in either domain a stark choice between realism and 
skepticism. There are intermediate options and these seem much more credible in the ethical 
case than the perceptual.  
 
 
Michael Huemer’s 2005 book Ethical Intuitionism is an admirably lucid and 
straightforward defence of intuitionistic moral realism According to Huemer, moral claims 
are claims about “a class of irreducible, objective properties, which cannot be known on the 
basis of observation.”3 So how are they known? They are known, he proposes, by intuition. 
Or at least the most fundamental ones are. We do not directly know by intuition, say, that the 
Iraq War was wrong if it was or that abortion is sometimes permissible if it is. But the most 
basic ethical truths can be known this way. Claims like: 
 
Enjoyment is better than suffering, 
If A is better than B and B is better than C then A is better than C. 
It is unjust to punish a person for a crime he did not commit. 
If a person has a right to do something, then no person has a right to forcibly prevent 
him from doing that thing.4 
 
Intuitions are not the same as but are “distinct from and normally prior to” beliefs.5  They are 
a species of seeming that can come apart from belief. So someone might have the standard set 
of apparently dissonant intuitions about the trolley problem: wrong to push fat man off 
bridge, OK to turn trolley – even though philosophical reflection has led them to conclude 
that one or other of them is false just as in the Mûller-Lyon Illusion the bottom line may still 
seem shorter even when we have come to know it is not.6 Our warrant for the trust we accord 
our intuitions these may be explained, Huemer suggests, with reference to what he calls the 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to Chris Cowie and Richard Rowland for inviting me to participate in the 
delightful and instructive conference at Rome from which this book arose; to my fellow 
participants there for their valuable input and to Philip Goff for his comments on an earlier 
draft.  
2 The Way is not far from human beings. When people follow a way that is far from human 
beings, it is not the Way.  






Principle of Phenomenal Conservativism according to which: “Other things being equal, it is 
reasonable to assume that things are the way they appear.”7  
It is not only ethical knowledge that is based on intuition in this way. It is, for 
example, only by intuition that I can know a priori that e.g. a thing cannot be both red all over 
and green all over or that simple, familiar logical forms are valid. Sense perception, memory 
and introspection of our own mental states are not, for Huemer, intuitions, but constitute 
seemings or appearances of a kind covered by the Principle of Phenomenal Conservativism. 
He appeals pervasively to analogies with these things, and to sense perception in particular.8 
Thus he illustrates the observation that intuitions are not infallible by means of a perceptual 
analogy: 
 
Suppose I seem to see a glass of water on the table. That is enough for me to justify 
believing there is a glass of water, in the absence of any countervailing evidence. 
However I may still hold this open to revision: if I reach for the ‘glass’ and find my 
hand passing through it, and if a dozen other people in the room say there is no glass 
there, I may decide there wasn’t a glass there after all. As this example illustrates we 
normally take perceptual beliefs to be prima facie justified, just as the Principle of 
Phenomenal Conservation dictates. There is no obvious obstacle to holding intuitive 
beliefs to be justified similarly.9 
 
Huemer, it is fair to say, likes the strategy J. L. Mackie dubbed argument from companions in 
guilt.10 In chapter 5 of his book, on “Moral Knowledge”, there is a version of it on almost 
every page. Thus he considers and responds to a variety of objections to his position of which 
the first demands some deeper rationale for supposing intuitions are reliable.  Here he retorts:  
 
What happens if we apply the principle generally: We need positive reasons for trusting 
appearances? Then we need positive reasons for trusting sense perception, memory, 
introspection, even reason itself.11 
 
But I don’t think proponents of this first objection intend to endorse either coherentism 
or skepticism in epistemology. Rather they believe intuition is somehow special, in a 
way that subjects it to a general demand for justifying grounds, a demand from which 
perception, memory, introspection and reasoning are exempt.12 
 
The second objection he considers is that we can have no independent check on whether 
intuitions are correct. Here Huemer think the same worry, again generalizes dangerously 
to other cases like introspection, memory and induction. In the case of perception he offers 
a dilemma. If we are a bit strict on what we count as an independent check, sense 
perception is also in trouble for we have no way of checking our sensory perceptions 
without relying in some way on other sense perceptions.  If we are more relaxed and allow 
that sense perception can be checked by seeing if the sense perceptions of others accord 
                                                        
7 99. Cf. 2001, 98-108.  
8 Another moral realist who appeals pervasively to an analogy with sense perception is Ralph 
Wedgwood in chapter 10 of his 2007. For critical discussion see my 2010, section 3.  
9 107. 





with it or whether it coheres with my own other sense perceptions, well we can – and do - 
do this with intuition as well.13  
 We know the dialectic here. Of course someone might say, we have abundant 
reason to believe our sense perception is generally reliable. Common sense, heavily 
supplemented by our best science, has a rich and detailed, if in some ways still incomplete, 
story to tell about how all this works. We know about optics, acoustics, the anatomy and 
psychology of the human eye, ear and other sensory receptors. We know about the 
complex processes where the physical world impacts on us and puts us in sensory states 
that our brains engage with to obtain and process rich and generally accurate information 
about the world around us. We can add an evolutionary story that tell how this came about 
in ancestral pre- and  proto-human populations because those members of it who were bad 
at this stuff had short lives and few if any offspring while those who were good at it 
became our ancestors. Lovely jubbly. But of course this whole story, the rich and detailed 
naturalistic story about sense perception we are in a position to tell ourselves only has the 
warrant we suppose it to have because of the rich and abundant empirical  evidence we 
have for it and that evidence only gets to count as evidence because we assume we can 
trust our sensory perception. So if we don’t beg the question in that way, Huemer has it, 
we get parity between the two cases. 
 Later in the chapter a further, but related objection is considered.14 Take the pair of 
statements: 
 
1. I have an intuition that p. 
2. P. 
 
1 is supposed to somehow justify accepting 2. But how? 2 certainly does not follow 
logically from 1. Perhaps we have inductive warrant to think ourselves justified in this 
because we have observed a correlation between intuitions abut ethical facts and ethical 
facts. But we cannot observe a correlation between intuitions and facts because we have 
no epistemic access to the facts except via intuition. Once again Huemer says taking this 
seriously puts us on a fast track to global skepticism. Here too he points out that we can 
use a precisely parallel argument to motivate scepticism about perception or memory. 
Thus, to take the former, our parallel statements could be: 
 
3. I have a sensory experience of x. 
4. x exists.  
 
Again there is certainly no logical entailment. And there is no inductive warrant based on 
a correlation between our perceptual experience and the facts it discloses as we have no 
non-perceptual access to those facts,  no access to the facts we know through perception 
that is itself independent of perception.  
 Of course, as Huemer acknowledges, this is hardly conclusive. Because the 
sceptical arguments look so similar it is likely they stand or fall together. But to conclude 
with any confidence that they do not stand fall we really need to say what the flaw is. Here 
Huemer appeals to the familiar ideal that in the case of perception we can somehow defuse 
the threat of skepticism by rejecting the veil of ideas picture offered by the 
indirect/representative realist in favour of a form of direct realism Sensations are not 
                                                        
13 108-9. 
14 117ff.  
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“internal states that somehow represent real things”. Rather they are “vehicles of the 
awareness of external things”.15 The “primary function of sensory experience is to a partly 
constitute our awareness of external things, rather than to be an intermediary object of 
awareness”.16 In parallel, Huemer argues,  
 
The intuitionist… should be a direct realist about ethics. He should not say that 
intuitions function as a kind of evidence from which we do or should infer moral 
conclusions, He should say that, for some moral truths, we need no evidence, since we 
are directly aware of them and that that awareness takes the form of intuitions; that is, 
intuitions just (partly) constitute our awareness of moral facts. Intuitions are not the 
objects of our awareness when we do moral philosophy. They are just the vehicles of 
our awareness, which we ‘see through’ to the moral reality.17.  
 
Here I confess myself unpersuaded. The idea, in the case of perception, that we can chase the 
threat of skepticism away by adopting direct realism, has always struck me as a terrific cheat. 
At best making this move would allow us to move the bump to another part of the carpet. To 
make an analogy with memory, we might insist it be built into our understanding of memory 
that memory is direct and veridical so there really can be no space for skepticism about 
whether any memories I might have furnish me with a true picture of the past. But as soon as 
we make that move we open up a very large and abundant space for skepticism about whether 
these states of mind I am experiencing are genuinely memories or merely quasi memories, 
apparent memories, of things that never happened or at least that never happened to me.18 For 
the direct realist, analogously the skeptical problem simply resurfaces as that of sorting cases 
of perception from cases of apparent perception. Whatever we think “transparency” amounts 
to phenomenologically, there is really nothing to stop the more capable Cartesian demons 
from faking it very convincingly.19  
 In the case of ethical intuition it is still harder to make sense of what is being 
proposed. Here we might begin by noting how Huemer’s endeavor, following George 
Bealer, to understand intuitions as a kind of intellectual seeming distinct from belief and 
                                                        
15 121, 
16 121. 
17 121-122. Cf. 2001, pp.81-85.  
18 Russell in an intriguing passage of his 1912 argues for a kind of direct realism about 
memory. “But for the fact of memory  in this sense, we should not know tghat there was ever 
a past at all, nor should we be able to understand the word ‘past, any more than a man birn 
blind can understand the word ‘light’.(1912, 66)  
19 This seems particularly so for the version of direct realism defended by Huemer in his 
earlier 2001. Perceptual experiences, Huemer argues there, are ‘purely internal’ mental states 
by which he means that their existence does not logically imply the existence of any external 
object. A non-veridical perceptual experience could be exactly like a veridical one. That 
leaves the sceptic able to exploit the epistemic possibility that sensory experience is 
systematically non-veridical. Huemer seeks, in 2001 chapter 8, to deflect this kind of brain in 
a vat sceptic by insisting that we have abundant evidence for the existence of the external 
world in the form of the facts that are the contents of our perceptual beliefs which he has 
argued  in chapter 5 are foundational. But the argument for that relied heavily on the 
Principle of Phenomenal Conservation and it seems to me that it is this and not the direct 
realism that is doing all the anti-sceptical heavy lifting here. 
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comparable to perceptual seemings is decidedly questionable. Here is Timothy 
Williamson: 
 
[I]ntellectual seemings typically lack the rich phenomenology of perceptual seemings. 
In its perceptually appearing that something is so, normally in the same event, much 
else perceptually appears too: that various things have various shapes and sizes, colors, 
sounds, tastes, textures, smells… By contrast, in the moment of its intellectually 
appearing that something is so, often nothing much else intellectually appears.20 
 
Williamson here is generalizing about intuitions of diverse kinds, modal, logical, etc as 
well as moral. With moral intuitions there is sometimes a bit more going on for sure but 
(a) that bit more is plausibly most saliently emotional in character which doesn’t much 
help given Huemer’s robust cognitivism (b) even with moral intuitions the word 
sometimes bears emphasis. The point moves Williamson to favour a sparser conception of 
intuitions, in the spirit of David Lewis and Peter van Inwagen, as simply beliefs or 
judgements. But if we did that it would be very hard to see how we might then understand 
something analogous to direct realism for moral intuition. 
There is a more central concern to be raised, it seems to me, about some of the things 
Huemer likes to say. Consider a passage I quoted earlier:  
 
What happens if we apply the principle generally. We need positive reasons for trusting 
appearances? Then we need positive reasons for trusting sense perception, memory, 
introspection, even reason itself…. But I don’t think  proponents of this first objection 
intend to endorse either coherentism or skepticism in epistemology.” 
 
The word “trusting” here is interesting. Very interesting.  What am I doing when I 
“trust” an intuition or a perceptual judgement? I guess it is to take it as correctly 
representing (some direct realists might prefer a different word – “disclosing” perhaps) 
how things really are. Well, yes, but how much in the way of robust response-
independence do we read into the word ‘really’? We are not after all presented in 
epistemology with a stark choice between one the one hand, the most robust species of 
metaphysical realism and on the other a skepticism which stands ready to reject the whole 
empirical world as a tissue of delusion. There is a rich spectrum of intermediate positions 
that have from time to time been taken very seriously by our philosophical forebears. 
There is idealism for example, in its classical formulation by Berkeley, and a whole long 
history of folk, positivists, phenomenalists, radical empiricists who have run variations on 
Berkeley’s project.  
 So is Berkeley in the business of withholding “trust” from sense perception? He 
would of course have strenuously denied that he was. He emphatically denies that he is 
defending any sort of scepticism or denying "the real existence of sensible things"21. As 
someone who takes himself to be a staunch defender of common sense he supposes he is 
doing no such thing. He doesn’t deny that the tables and chairs and mountains and rivers 
exist. Au contraire! He simply denies that they are non-mental. The idealist takes these 
things to be perfectly real but simply made of ideas. Or, we might suppose, as a very 
                                                        
20 Williamson 2008, 217. 
21 Berkeley 1713, 152. 
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similar thought was later elegantly put, that they are logical constructions out of sense 
data.22 
 
What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own 
bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all which, 
and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles 
premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, 
or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. 
There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its 
full force.23 
 
 The idealist can give you the mountains and the chairs. She can give you the whole 
world. In fact she can give you the whole of science. Whether we take it to be material or 
mental, the material world is an orderly place. It is full of patterns and uniformities. What 
we call science, on this view, is just a rigorous and painstaking description of these 
patterns and uniformities that doesn’t presuppose realism about a mind-independent 
external world. Absent that supposition we still have a world and indeed it is still external. 
The table is ten meters away from my body. The sun is approximately 150 million 
Kilometers away from my body. These are facts about how things are arranged in space 
that have a clear operational meaning in an idealist take on reality and continue to be 
perfectly true. 
For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a 
truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing 
principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if 
it be not perceived it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I 
answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles we 
have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no 
more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been 
observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and 
such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive 
the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like 
one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to 
mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena. 
We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our 
minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded 
predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of 
actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in 
case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. 
Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very 
consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever 
objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other 
discoveries in astronomy or nature.24 
                                                        
22 Russell 1922, Lecture 2. 
23 Berkeley 1710, $34. 
24 Berkeley 1710, $58-59. 
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 For the idealist there is still a perfectly clear sense to be given to the idea of 
trusting my sense perceptions. Here I am visually perceiving an apple. I trust my 
perception insofar as I believe that if reach out and grab it I will have tactile perceptions of 
the sort I have come to expect from an apple, that if I move it towards the place where I 
am – in various ways – sensible of the presence of my mouth, I can have gustatory 
perceptions of the kind I have come to expect from an apple, that if, in this way, I consume 
it and a sufficiency of other suitable edible things I am thereby more likely to experience 
the world in the way I associate with having a healthy, well nourished body. If such 
expectations as these all go disappointed, if, to echo Huemer, I reach for the ‘apple’ and 
find my hand passing through it, and if a dozen other people in the room say there is no 
apple there, that would be the sort of case I would describe as having an illusory sensory 
experience as of an apple, something I thereby quite readily distinguish from encountering 
a real one.  
 We might even regard this as a kind of, to coin a nice expression, quasi-realism 
about the external world.25 We begin by seeming to deny it, insisting on the reality only of 
the, as we suppose them, inner world of ideas. We then rebuild it from those very ideas, 
rebutting, a la Berkeley the charge of scepticism, vindicating both science and common 
sense, earning the right to talk the way we always have. We get the natural world back. 
We get science back. Lovely jubbly.  
 But now look what we have gone and done. We got science back. We got the 
world back. But if we get these things back something comes back with it. What we get 
back with it is, among many other things, what I earlier labelled the naturalistic story 
about sense perception. We can explain and understand the phenomenon of sense 
perception in exactly the ways I sketched above. Sense perception is reliable in virtue of 
our having the bodily apparatus that we do which has evolved over countless generations 
of natural selection to be ever so good at this stuff. Just look at all the lovely empirical 
evidence we have for that now that we got science back.  
 And now what is striking about this picture is that it is really weird. I am almost 
tempted to say queer. We reconstruct the natural world from the raw material of our ideas 
only to find ourselves, and them, inside it. We started out with an idea of sense perception 
as the metaphysically fundamental thing from which we construct the whole universe. So 
we went and constructed it. And – crikey! - it was ever so big. Huge numbers of galaxies 
of stars, around one of which we find orbiting our own little world populated by us small 
mammalian organisms of whose cognitive rapport with their environment we have a rich 
naturalistic tale to tell. Sense-data, ideas, perceptual seemings, call them what you like, 
start out as the metaphysical building blocks of this vast universe only to end up getting 
situated within it as a tiny, extremely local, phenomenon in s small corner of it. We have a 
world that is metaphysically composed out of ideas and at the same time physically 
composed out of atoms with ideas, anything remotely mental, strikingly absent from 
almost all of it. Maybe physical and metaphysical composition can be wrenched apart in 
this way but the whole picture is surely looking strained.26 Wouldn’t it be more elegant, 
                                                        
25 Cf. Pearce 2017b. 
26 We might try to eliminate the strain by going the whole Berkeley and putting a divine 
mind at the centre of this system. It would be weird if the whole universe were 
metaphysically dependent on the mentations of small and insignificant, extremely 
localised beasts like ourselves. But God is large and significant and omnipresent so adding 
him to the picture leads to a different story. I myself think theism is too philosophically 
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less extragavant, less strained in this weird way, to just jettison the metaphysical picture 
and simply embrace the natural one. The quasi-realist reconstruction of the sensory world 
promises to conserve the insights and understanding we owe to science, reconstructing 
from the data of experience the world that enterprise discloses. It is when we put ourselves 
into that world, as figures in a landscape not of our making, that the quasi-realist project 
looks liable to crash.  
 None other than Hylas comes very close to spotting the problem but is bamboozled –
as always - by Philonous. 
 
Hyl: It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the 
nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body; and that outward 
objects, by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate 
certain vibrations to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits, propagate them to the 
brain or seat of the soul, which according to the various impressions or traces thereby 
made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas. 
Phil: And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas.  
Hyl: Why not, Philonous? Have you any thing to object against it? 
Phil: I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. You make certain 
traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray, tell me, whether by 
brain you mean any sensible thing?  
Hyl: What else think you I could mean? 
Phil: Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things that are 
immediately perceivable, are ideas; and these exist only in the mind. This much you have, 
if I mistake not long since agreed to. 
Hyl: I do not deny it. 
Phil: The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. 
Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing 
existing in the mind, occasions all other ideas. And if you think so, pray how do you 
account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself? 
Hyl: I do not explain the origin of our ideas by the brain which is perceivable to sense, this 
being itself only a combination of sensible ideas, but by another which I imagine. 
Phil: But are not things imagined as truly in the mind as things perceived?  
Hyl: I must confess they are.27 
                                                        
costly an investment for theistic idealism to be credible. And perhaps theism would not 
help after all. Thus Kenneth Pearce: “As has long been recognized, the divine idea theory 
is a disaster for Berkeley because it is really a form of representative realism. On this 
view, the “archetype” in the divine mind is the real object, and my perception is veridical 
just in case it accurately copies that archetype. But then Berkeley falls victim to his own 
well-known criticism of representative realism. [at 1713, 238-9]” (2017a, 233-4) I don’t 
know if pan-psychic variants such as Yetter-Chappell 2017 can hope to fix this problem. 
With Yetter-Chappell we are not talking about a copying relation but something much 
more intimate. “When I perceive the world around me, my mind overlaps with—and is 
partially constituted by—bits of the phenomenal tapestry that is reality.” (71) The problem 
is that my sensory experience has a very different character to that of a Martian (as Yetter-
Chappell herself recognizes - 78) or that of the brute animals that feed on filth and ordure 
(Berkeley 2013 161) or any of the countless other perceiving creatures that do or might 
exist. You’re going to need a lot of reality if this is going to work.  
27 Berkeley 1713, 194. 
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Phil: Not comes therefore to the same thing; and you have been all this while accounting 
for ideas by certain motions or impression in the brain, that is, by some alterations in an 
idea, whether sensible or imaginable, it matters not. 
Hyl:I begin to suspect my hypothesis.  
 
Perhaps what Philonous says here is coherent but in rejecting an understanding of the mental 
as causally downstream of myriad physical processes and things he loses all his credibility as 
a champion of common sense. We can’t sensibly think of the universe in all its hugeness and 
antiquity as somehow constructed out of things that feature in the mental lives of evolved 
bodily creatures built from protein that only showed up very late in its long history.  
Huemer is surely correct that we cannot hope for an inductive warrant to suppose 
sense perception reliable based on a correlation between our perceptual experience and the 
facts its discloses as we have no non-perceptual access to those facts. We have no way to, 
as it were, look around or behind the perceptual appearances to check that the perceived 
objects are really there. That is indeed forlorn. But it looks much more promising to think 
the best warrant we have for such a supposition rather than being inductive would take, as 
Russell for example proposed, the form of an inference to best explanation.28 Of course 
any warrant we thereby obtain is a defeasible one. It remains an epistemic possibility that I 
am demon deceived, a brain in a vat, the dupe of a computer simulation or whatever your 
favourite skeptical hypothesis says I am. But consistent with that possibility I can perhaps 
legitimately insist that the best explanation of why I seem to see a table is that 
(prescinding from a bit of detail) there is a table there, my eyes are in working order and 
the light is on. It is certainly an explanation lacking the significant infelicity just observed 
in the quasi-realist alternative. 
 Once we have the natural world epistemically in play we can tell this tale. We can 
rehearse the rich and detailed naturalistic story about sense perception. Sadly we cannot 
rehearse the rich and detailed naturalistic story about ethical intuition. Because there isn’t 
one or at least not the sort of one the realist would need. Common sense supplemented by 
science has a rich and detailed, if of course incomplete, story to tell us about how the 
physical world impacts on our cognitive apparatus to produce perceptual sensations and 
perceptual beliefs. We haven’t, by very stark contrast, the remotest conception how ethical 
intuition, understood in the realist spirit Huemer defends, is meant to work. We have these 
ethical seemings and we have them, it seems we are supposed to believe, because some 
kind of extra sensory process we know nothing about puts us somehow cognitively in 
touch with the supposed ethical facts. It is just this very significant disanalogy that is the 
basic thought behind the epistemic phase of Mackie’s argument from queerness. We may 
perhaps supplement that thought by the sort of evolutionary considerations aired by 
Sharon Street29: isn’t it striking how our core normative beliefs are exactly what we would 
might expect them to be if our coming by them had a naturalistic explanation where they 
are shaped by evolution in ways that need appeal only to their adaptive function and not to 
their accuracy? 
 I noted above that we are not after all presented in epistemology with a stark 
choice between, on the one hand, the most robust species of metaphysical realism and, on 
the other, a stark, despairing skepticism. Of course the same thing is true of ethics. You 
can be a robust realist like Huemer or Wedgwood or Enoch.30 You can be a sceptic, like 
                                                        
28 Russell 1912, chapter 2. 
29 Street 2006. 
30 Huemer 2005, Wedgwood 2011, Enoch 2011. 
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Mackie perhaps.31 (Except as Blackburn points out, when Mackie says he is a sceptic he 
doesn’t really mean it.32 Maybe others do. I am never quite sure.)  And there is a big range 
of intermediate positions, quasi-realists, constructivists and others who try to sail a safe 
philosophical passage between Scylla and Charybdis.33 There are more things for 
                                                        
31 Mackie 1977. 
32 Blackburn 1993 
33 It would be unfair in the case of Huemner to level a straight charge of false dichotomy as 
he gives considerable airtime to other possibilities. I have been discussing mostly chapter 5 of 
his book but chapters 2 to 4 are called, respectively “Non-cognitivism”, “Subjectivism” and 
“Reductionism” and contain arguments against all those things so we may take it he supposes 
he has whittled the menu down appropriately. In no case I suspect is the whittling thorough 
enough to convince. I’ll say a little only about chapter 2 as non-cognitivism is my favourite. 
More significantly it is the view that has been developed into quasi-realism by its leading 
contemporary exponents. - though in fact quasi-realists, just because they are quasi-realists, 
seldom use the term ‘non-cognitivism’ to describe themselves, though it is widely used of 
them by their detractors, including Huemer. Huemer’s key dialectical move against ‘non-
cognitivism’ then is to rehearse the familiar observation that the surface syntactical character 
and of moral language has a decidedly assertoric flavour. Of course that is hardly checkmate 
as the whole point of the quasi-realist programme has been precisely to recognise that fact 
and seek to explain it. Huemer is well aware of this but is unimpressed with the efforts of 
quasi-realist philosophers to bring the thing off, wanting no truck with their “meta-linguistic 
trickery”, whose effort to “embrace common sense in words but reject it in substance” he 
compares explicitly to Berkeley’s (he thinks unconvincing) protestations that he was not a 
sceptic.(44) Humer considers Gibbard’s (1990) proposal to capture the logical behaviour of  
normative language by means of a system of factual-normative worlds. Meaning, for 
Goibbard , “lies in what is ruled out.”(1990, 99); we are to understand the state of mind 
expressed by a normative statement by reference to its “ruling out various combinations of 
normative systems with factual possibilities.”(1990, 99) As Huemer explains, “Gibbard wants 
to explain the meaning of the conditional ‘If it was wrong to steal the candy, then God will 
punish you’, by reference to the set of factual-normative worlds that the speaker’s state of 
mind rules out.” (33) Indeed. So the sentence in question rules out all factual-normative 
world where the normative impermissibility of the candy stealing is combined with the 
factual condition of you going unpunished by God. But now he complains that if we take the 
atomic states of believing God will punish you, not so believing, being agnostic about this, 
approving candy stealing, disapproving and  not caring, we cannot combine these in a way 
that rules out just what we need to rule out. Indeed we cannot. What puzzles me is why 
Huemer thinks it is a problem  Conditionals are not conjunctions What is expressed by a 
conditional cannot be expressed as a conjunction constructed out of the antecedent, the 
consequent and their respective negations, though of course if it is a material conditional it 
can be expressed as the negation of one. So Gibbard’s inability to express the state of mind in 
question as a combination of these elements should neither surprise nor trouble us. Huemer 
now turns to Blackburn’s proposal (1998, 71) that we understand conditionals as expressing 
dispositional states. If I accept ‘If p then q’ then I express a disposition to accept q should I 
come to accept p. But not quite of course. I might come to accept p and not come to accept q 
because when I come to accept p I change my mind about the conditional. Huemer think is 
this is fatal for Blackburn because  it “empties his analysis of content” (36) Compare the 
disposition expressed by a disjunction: to accept ‘R or S’ to be disposed to come to accept R 
if I should come to reject S and vice versa. This too is hypothetical. I might just reject the 
original disjunction. (Sometimes I am certain to as with Huemer’s example of his acceptance 
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“trusting” my intuitions to be than what the robust realist supposes. The key difference 
between the ethical and the perceptual case concerns the credibility of our making sense of 
our experience somewhere in this middle ground. In the ethical case, it seems to me, we 
are on much stronger ground here.   
 Here we are with our intuitions trying to figure out what is right. We do so by seeking 
to impose coherence upon them both intrapersonally in deliberation and interpersonally in 
codeliberation. What our earth is afoot? Here Rawls in Political Liberalism famously 
contrasts two contrasting understandings of the sort of enterprise in which he is engaged, that 
of the rational intuitionist and that of the political constructivist. Both views rely on the idea 
of reflective equilibrium but the constructivist understands this not as a theoretical procedure 
tracking some independent truth but as at the service of a practical political project where 
terms of social cooperation are to be established not by appeal to an outside authority or to an 
independent order of moral values but by “an undertaking among those persons themselves in 
view of what they regard as their reciprocal advantage.” “The bases of this view lie in 
fundamental ideas of the public political culture as well as in citizens’ shared principles and 
conceptions of practical reason.”34 
 We can understand these positions by contrasting they way they understand 
intuitions, the inputs, as it were, to the process of reflective equilibrium. For rational 
intuitionism these are to be conceived of as a form of perceptual or quasi perceptual 
epistemic accessing of the order of independent moral facts intuitionists take to be the subject 
matter of ethics. Not so for the constructivist. For him, the inputs are rather expressions of, as 
Rawls has it, the public political culture of western democratic societies, of us, of our own 
moral sensibilities as we find them in the historical and cultural place where we are. When 
we conceive of the project of moral inquiry as concerned with the distinctively practical 
project of a group of people trying to arrive at an agreement about what moral understandings 
they might all be prepared to accept and to share and regulate their lives together by, 
intuitions are not best understood as representations of a realm of normative reality 
constituted prior to and independent of our ethical experience but as expressions of who we 
are and what we care about. And from this philosophical perceptive the important thing about 
intuitions is, as Bernard Williams put it, not that they “should be in some ultimate sense 
correct, but that they should be ours.”35   
 That distinctively practical project, according to me, is what ethics is. I take it to be 
an enterprise driven ultimately by the passions in the souls as we seek to arrive at shared 
                                                        
of “Either there are unicorns living on the planet Jupiter, or cows have four stomachs.” – v-
introduction is cheap!) But of course the complex dispositional state expressed by a 
conditional is different to the complex dispositional state expressed by a disjunction. And 
dispositions that are vacuous can hardly be distinct. Huemer insists that “claims about one’s 
dispositions must entail determinate predictions regarding actions apart from the ‘actions’ of 
acquiring and losing the dispositions.” (36) But I’m not sure when this got to be a rule. To be 
angry with someone, someone might suggest, is to have a disposition to punch them – unless 
of course in the meantime one has ceased to be angry. To be enamoured of someone, the 
same theorist goes on to suggest, is to have a disposition to give them a cuddle – unless of 
course in the meantime one ceases to be enamoured. This little dispositional theory of the 
emotions is a little simple-minded for sure but it is hardly vacuous. Both the angry disposition 
and the enamoured disposition are hypothetical just like Blackburn’s inferential dispositions. 
But this is complexity, not vacuity, which is how the two dispositions manage to be so clearly 
distinct.  
34 Rawls 1993, 97. 
35 1985, p. 102.  
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moral understandings we can agree to endorse and have regulate our lives together in 
moral community.36 All kinds of emotional37 and semantic ascent is possible here that 
may earn us the right to speak of truth, objectivity, facts, realities, and so on. The 
deflationary, quasi-realist project is familiar to us all.38 It is a picture of ethics as 
something we want and need to help us meet our various human desires, aspirations and 
ideals and that is ultimately woven from the fabric of those things without reference to 
some external, independent order of value, something that seems to me quite redundant in 
understanding or motivating what we are about.  
Like our sensory experiences, these desires, aspirations and ideals are, on a cosmic 
scale, very small, localized, human things but they serve a very small localized, human 
purpose. They have no lofty ambitions. So the ethical quasi-realist whatever their other 
claims is not threatened by the kind of weirdness – queerness even – I diagnosed for their 
counterpart in the case of sense perception. While we cannot credibly construct the natural 
world out of bits of our mental experience, we can credibly construct the ethical world 
from the passions in our soul. The idealist’s quasi-realist project with the empirical world 
ended up looking decidedly queer. In ethics, by contrast, we quasi-realists are not the 
queer ones. The idea that the empirical world is somehow “just us” would be a kind of  
anthropocentric madness. But it is hard to see how ethics could be anything other than a 
human thing serving human ends. Here anthropocentrism makes abundant sense. The Way 
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